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Abstract
Many paradigmatic forms of animal rights and environmental activism have been classed as 
terrorism both in popular discourse and in law. This paper argues that the labelling of many violent 
forms of direct action carried out in the name of animal rights or environmentalism as ‘terrorism’ is 
incorrect. Furthermore, the claim is also made that even those acts which are correctly termed as 
terrorism are not necessarily wrongful acts. The result of this analysis is to call into question the 
terms of public debate and the legitimacy of anti-terrorism laws targeting and punishing radical 
activism. 
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n public discourse and in positive law many forms of illegal animal rights and environmental 
activism have come to be labelled as terrorism. However, analysis of the concept of terrorism, 
and of the actions of animal and environmental activists, reveals this to be in large part an 
error. Although there is a great deal of conceptual wrangling over the correct application of the term 
terrorism, it is often defined either in terms of the intentions of terrorist agents or by reference to the 
moral status of the victims of terrorist acts. I refer to these two conceptions of terrorism as the non-
moralised and moralised accounts of terrorism respectively. Non-moralised accounts tend focus on 
the intentions of agents carrying out violent acts to strike fear as a strategy for provoking political 
change. To establish that an act is terrorism does not require that one make an a priori judgement 
about the morality of those acts. Moralised conceptions, on the other hand, include the innocence of 
its victims as part of the definition of terrorism. Under both moralised and non-moralised 
conceptions of terrorism, most violent and illegal acts carried-out in the name of non-human 
animals or the environment should not be labelled as terrorism. The reason for this is that under the 
non-moralised account most illegal acts carried out by animal and environmental activists carry the 
wrong intentions to be classed as terrorism. And, under the moralised account, the innocence of the 
objects of so-called terrorist acts can be shown to be questionable. These conclusions challenge 
orthodox views of animal rights and environmental ‘terrorism’. They also call into question the 
legitimacy of laws which target animal rights and environmental activism, particularly those which 
classify violent activism as terrorism,[1] and they should cause us to think again about the terms of 
public and political discourse. Beyond that, the conclusions also force us to reconsider whether 
violent animal rights and environmental activism can be classed as morally wrong as a class of acts.
I
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In the United States the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act covers any intentional damage or 
interference with the operations of an animal enterprise regardless of whether those acts carry a 
political motivation or an intention to cause terror.(U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005) 
Similarly, the UK government (Travis, 2005), and the European Law Enforcement Agency, Europol 
(Europol, 2011a), all apply expansive classifications of terrorism which can include acts 
unmotivated by the first-order desire for political change or any terror-causing intent. The ascription 
of the term ‘terrorism’ to a wide variety of criminal acts carried out by animal rights and 
environmental activists is repeated in the rhetoric of state officials.(cf. Lewis, 2005, 2004) 
Meanwhile, media coverage of animal rights and environmental activists regularly portrays them as 
terrorists, emphasising the use of violence and failing to distinguish between different classes of 
acts and the intentions behind them.[2] Such mistakes are also repeated in the academic literature 
on terrorism where we see the conflation of a spectrum of illegal activities with terrorism, 
particularly where those activities involve violence against property or person. (cf. Hirschmann, 
2000; Humphrey and Stears, 2006; Monaghan, 1999; Vanderheiden, 2005) For example, Kai 
Hirschmann, in a section devoted to AR and eco-terrorism, does not move beyond labelling ‘resort 
to threats, violence and destruction’ as terrorism, including a variety of ‘extremist tactics’ under the 
rubric of terrorism.(Hirschmann, 2000, p. 302) Similarly, Rachel Monaghan makes the sufficient 
conditions for classifying an act as terrorism overly broad by making philosophical convictions 
synonymous with political motives. She writes: “the activities of those groups willing to use 
violence against property and persons in the pursuit of animal rights can be viewed as a campaign 
incorporating the core characteristics of ‘terrorism’...those activists...can be seen to possess a 
political motive, namely a philosophical conviction that animals have rights’”.(Monaghan, 1999, p. 
166) As I go on to show, the conviction that non-human animals have rights can motivate violent 
acts carrying a variety of intentions and not necessarily including an overriding intention to bring 
political change. The problems identified so far in the orthodox understanding of animal rights and 
environmental ‘terrorism’ can be addressed by looking at the necessary and sufficient conditions of 
terrorism and establishing whether they are present in various types of activism. This latter aim is 
aided by a clear taxonomy of different classes of activism.
Non-moralised conceptions of terrorism, as I have outlined, usually describe terrorism in terms of 
the intentions of the putative terrorist to achieve political goals using intimidation and coercion 
through violence or its threat. In many cases the threat or use of violence is intended to influence a 
far wider community than merely the direct objects of that violence by making them fearful of the 
negative consequences of non-acquiescence to terrorist demands.[3] This broad definition allows us 
to distinguish between terrorists and terrorism, contains the paradigmatic features of terrorism 
found in ordinary language usage, and puts clear conceptual water between terrorism and other 
forms of political and non-political violence.(Anne Schwenkenbecher, 2012) The moralised 
conception of terrorism differs only in that the object of violence, threat, or fear is innocent.
The first consequence of applying the definition above to the case of animal and environmental 
activism is that it rules out non-violent acts from classification as terrorism. Many forms of 
activism, whilst illegal, do not at the same time involve real or intended violence. Following 
Bufacchi, I define violence as something which infringes upon the integrity of a thing or being. 
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That is, violence takes away something from its object ‘shattering the pre-existing psychological 
and/or physical unity that was in place before the violence took place’(Bufacchi, 2007). Violence 
thus applies to physical and psychological attacks directed at both property and living beings, and is 
distinguished from other senses of the term, such as that used when describing forceful acts like 
violently slamming a door or a violent verbal outburst. Bufacchi’s conception of violence has the 
benefit of cohering well with the sense usually meant in the context of terrorism and excluding 
inappropriate ordinary language usage of the term.
Illegal animal rights and environmental activism takes many forms. They include such acts as 
arson, splashing of paint on fur clothing, vandalism, graffiti, contaminating products, disrupting 
phone and email communications and hacking websites, assault, threats of violence, trespass, theft, 
causing nuisance, marches and protest gatherings, spiking trees,[4] sabotage of equipment, 
obstruction and picketing, and the public dissemination of private data. In one infamous UK case, 
the remains of the deceased grandmother of a farm owner who bread guinea pigs for supply to 
laboratories were stolen by activists.(Britten, n.d.) Each of these kinds of acts can be classified 
according to the intentions, their objects, and the methods used in them into the following taxonomy 
of radical activism: sabotage, civil disobedience, rescue, and terrorism.[5] The four taxa differ 
significantly and in ways which exclude most violent acts from being correctly categorised as 
terrorism. Each is outlined below.
Sabotage involves damage to property intended to prevent, hinder, and disrupt practices that harm 
non-human animals or damage the environment. Examples include those acts described in Edward 
Abbey’s novel The Monkey Wrench Gang. In The Monkey Wrench Gang the book’s protagonists 
damage construction vehicles, move survey stakes, and destroy equipment in order to prevent the 
building of an environmentally damaging damn.(Abbey, 2004) Whilst these kinds of acts may be 
violent in the sense that property damage infringes upon the integrity of a thing, the intention 
behind them is the prevention of wider harms or damage deemed more significant than that caused. 
Sabotage is directly aimed at its object; there is no indirect target or associated communicative 
aspect, and nor is there any intention to strike fear for the purpose of bringing about political 
change. Lacking an intention to cause terror and so change beliefs or policies, acts of sabotage 
intended to prevent particular wrongs should not be thought of as terrorism.
One problem revealed by beginning the taxonomy is that it relies upon knowing the intentions of 
activists. In the non-ideal world it is very often possible to infer or know the intentions behind the 
actions of animal rights and environmental activists not only because the actions speak for 
themselves, but also because activists issue statements explaining their reasons for action. 
Furthermore, many of activist groups are structured in line with their intentions, so that groups like 
the Animal Liberation Front operate clandestinely and according to a cell-structure, whereas those 
like the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society operate transparently. Thus, it is possible to go some 
way towards inferring intentions from an organisation's structure and historical approach to 
achieving their aims. Nevertheless, there remains a distinct possibility that third party observers will 
not know with certainty what the intentions behind an act are and so will be forced to rely upon 
imperfect knowledge in classifying an act. However, I do not think this represents a significant 
problem for assessing the moral and conceptual status of the forms of activism discussed here.
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Unlike sabotage, civilly disobedient acts are conscientious acts intended to bring about political 
change or express a viewpoint through deliberate breach of law as a means of communicating moral 
beliefs and strength of conviction.(Brownlee, 2004) Whether one thinks civil disobedience is by 
definition non-violent or not, it can be distinguished from terrorism by the absence of any intention 
induce of fear as the means to bring about political change.[6] Many types of animal and 
environmental activism are aimed at bringing about political change though illegal, communicative 
means of protest: marches, sit-down protests, the chaining of activists to railings, graffiti, computer 
hacking, etc., but in each of these cases the intention is to highlight perceived injustice and 
communicate strength of conviction. As such, even if we do not exclude violent acts from the 
definition of civil disobedience these kinds of communicative acts should still not be defined as 
terrorist. 
The communicative aspect of civil disobedience may serve to distinguish civilly disobedient acts 
from sabotage, rescue, and terrorism in more than purely conceptual terms. Forms of civil 
disobedience may also express aspects of particular social movements which differentiate them 
from clandestine forms of radical activism. Although taking this fact into account does not help 
with conceptualising terrorism, since terrorist acts are not defined by the doctrines or dispositions of 
the actors performing them, it may nevertheless provide clues as to the intentions of agents and so 
assist with addressing the epistemic problem discussed above. Having made this point, it would be a 
mistake to think that acts of rescue and sabotage never carry a communicative aspect with them; 
activists often film their activities and issue statements in order to make a wider political point. 
However, when they do so the communicative act should be thought of as secondary to the primary 
intention of harm prevention.
Along the same lines as sabotage; rescue acts carried out to free animals from laboratories or farms, 
or obstructive acts intended to prevent environmental damage,[7] have harm prevention as the 
intention behind them. When activists rescue puppies from vivisection it is not their intention to do 
so as a means of communicating their convictions or changing beliefs, but for the sake of the 
individual animal that they rescue. Similarly, when groups such as the charity Sea Shepherd 
Conservation Society disrupt whaling activities, it is in order to conserve endangered species and 
not as a means of communicating conviction, striking terror, or affecting political change. Nor is it 
the case that rescue acts need involve violence of any sort to achieve success. Labelling acts that not 
only may not be violent, but have harm prevention as their central aim as terrorist acts would 
constitute a perverse stretching of the concept of terrorism. 
One potential response to some of the claims above might be to suggest that what matters is 
whether illegal violent acts have the consequence of spreading fear or terror regardless of whether 
that fear was intended as part of the act. So, even if care is taken to avoid harm to persons during an 
act of sabotage, one might still expect certain kinds of act to generate fear regardless of the 
intention behind them. For example, when in 2001 members of the Earth Liberation Front burned 
down the offices of the Superior Logging company in Glendale, Oregon USA, they did so taking 
care not to cause any harm to humans in the process.(Curry and Cullman, 2011) Nevertheless, it is 
reasonable to assume that, even if activists took care to avoid harm to persons and carried out the 
act with the sole intention of preventing logging, those faced with the threat of arson would have 
 JTR Volume 4, Issue 2 - Autumn 2013 29
become fearful as a result. Similarly, when the Earth Liberation Front spiked trees in the Robinson-
Scott timber harvest site in Oregon in 1997, they placed the spikes high to prevent loggers hitting 
them and marked trees to identify them as spiked to loggers. Such actions warn loggers that it is 
dangerous to harvest a tree and reduce their economic value,(Coombs, 2008) but there is no direct 
intention to cause bodily harm – indeed, clear steps are taken to avoid it. However, given that an 
earlier tree-spiking in 1987 is believed to have resulted in the accidental serious injury of a mill 
worker when his saw hit the spike and shattered, one might reasonably think such activities likely to 
spread fear as a side effect. (Bari, 1994, p. 264–270) Indeed, this is true even though some 
investigations have pointed the finger at poor safety measures at the mill site where the injury 
occurred rather than the spike itself; the belief that tree-spiking was the cause of the injury, even if 
that belief is false or out of proportion to the real risk, means that any acts of tree-spiking following 
the incident are still likely to cause fear.
The problem with classifying acts which generate unintended fear as terrorism is that it makes the 
correct ascription of the term terrorism dependent upon the emotional response of the object of an 
act. If two people were the victims of an otherwise identical act, and one felt no fear, whilst the 
other became fearful, then we would be forced to conclude that the first action was not terrorism but 
the second one was. Furthermore, even if both acts were intended to cause fear through violence, 
we would find ourselves in the strange position of declaring that the one that failed to terrify its 
victim was not terrorism. This same rule would have to apply to acts intended to be terrorism, but 
which somehow failed, or succeeded but were mistakenly attributed to natural or accidental causes. 
Such a conception of terrorism would be unable to match ordinary language usage or our intuitions 
about terrorism. What is more, acts such as making a horror film, which terrify as a matter of 
intention but are not at the same time meant to bring political change as a result, would also have to 
be classified as terrorism. Definitions of terrorism that rely upon the emotional effect of the victim, 
and no not make reference to the intentions of the subject of an act are, as we can see, highly 
problematic. Nevertheless, the determined critic might reply that acts that use violence as a means 
of bringing political change, and that can reasonably expected to cause fear in most people as an 
unintended side effect should be considered terrorism. This approach would deal with the problem 
of the particularly brave victim above by relying upon a probability-based impartial assessment. 
Such a definition might exclude tree-spiking and arson as a means of sabotage from the definition 
because they are not motivated by the desire for political change, but it would make civil 
disobedience involving property damage, and that made onlookers fearful, into terrorism. 
However, such a conception of terrorism continues to carry undesirable consequences with it. For 
one thing, it would make all soldiers fighting in wars into terrorists. After all, it is reasonable to 
think that soldiers shooting at one another strike fear, and that they fight for a political cause using 
violence as their means. To escape this problem requires making implausible claims such as that 
armed agents of the state cannot be terrorists, or that soldiers cannot commit terrorist acts against 
one another. Rather than adopting these kinds of implausible conceptions of terrorism and relying 
on ad hoc modifications to address the problems they throw up, it may be better to consider the 
Doctrine of Double Effect when assessing the status of an act. Thus, if a putative act of 
environmental or animal rights terrorism causes foreseeable terror in its victims or the wider public, 
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but this terror is an unintended although known consequence of the act, we should classify the act 
according to its primary intentions rather than its expected or actual consequences.(cf. Hadley, 
2009)
As we can see, many paradigmatic forms of animal and environmental ‘extremism’, of the sorts 
carried out by groups such as the Earth Liberation Front, Earth First, the Animal Liberation Front, 
and Justice Department, do not fall within the definition of terrorism. This is because they carry the 
wrong intentions, or they lack other essential features of terrorism such as a communicative aspect 
or the use of violence and terror. Nevertheless, there remain a range of activities which can 
potentially be classed as animal rights or environmental terrorism. Threats of kidnap or violence, 
intimidating protests outside of laboratory workers’ homes, contamination of products, arson 
attacks, car bombs etc., could all be intended as a form of fear-inducing coercive technique 
involving violence and aimed at bringing political and behavioural change. For example, in 2010 
there were 24 arson attacks using incendiary or explosive devices connected with animal and 
environmental groups in the EU.[8] Animal rights groups also used blackmail, sent messages to 
workers connected with animal research threatening their person, families, and property ((Europol, 
2011b)). In 2007 the Animal Rights Militia claimed to have contaminated Salvon antiseptic ((Batty, 
2007)), and in 1997 the Animal Liberation Front plotted to contaminate Lucozade drinks ((Eichel, 
1991)). In what follows, I demonstrate that under a moralised conception of terrorism, where the 
victims of terrorist acts are considered innocent by definition, many if not most of these acts should 
not be considered as terrorism. As an up-shot of this it turns out that there is also a substantial 
justification for animal and environmental terrorism under a non-moralised account. This is because 
there are reasons to question the innocence of victims of animal rights and environmental activism 
connected with their blameworthiness and complicity in harming others.
Moralised conceptions of terrorism include judgements about the victims of terrorist acts. These 
conceptions define terrorism as acts of the sort described by the non-moralised account, but carried 
out against innocent targets.(Coady, 1985; Narveson, 1991; Primoratz, 1990; Rodin, 2004; Walzer, 
2006) Under the moralised conception, the victims of terrorist acts are innocent because they pose 
no threat, are non-combatants, or because they do not participate in violence.(Anne 
Schwenkenbecher, 2012) Because they are innocent, agents are rendered immune from attack. For 
animal rights and environmental activism to be a form of terrorism it would therefore have to be 
established that the targets of their threats and violence are innocent. In the case of animal rights 
extremism, it is certainly true that those targeted pose no threat to activists. However, it is not the 
case that the innocence of victims of terrorism is established by whether they pose a direct threat to 
the terrorist themselves, but rather whether they pose a threat to someone or some group the 
terrorist claims to represent. To say than agent is lacks innocence in the sense above is to say that 
the agent is morally responsible for wrongdoing. Thus, the animal rights activist can claim that 
those who harm animals in certain practices are not only acting wrongly but are doing so as moral 
agents with knowledge of the consequences and the ability to have acted otherwise than they did. 
Under this standard definition of moral responsibility, an agent who performs a wrongful act is 
deserving of blame for their actions and liable, ceteris paribus, to loss of certain immunities. 
Whether those immunities include physical harm is discussed below.
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Whilst much of the analysis of radical activism under the non-moralised conception of terrorism 
was focused on the intentions of agents, in the case of moralised conceptions it hinges on potential 
justifications offered. In some ways this restricts the scope of this latter half of the paper for, whilst 
it may be relatively straightforward to infer motivations and intentions for paradigm animal rights 
and environmental ‘extremism,’ the justifications offered by activists are necessarily complex, 
varied, and dependent on agents’ background political and comprehensive doctrines. For this 
reason, the arguments in this section of the paper are restricted to the ideal. Instead, I consider 
whether putative acts of terrorism a) are terrorism at all and, b) whether they can be justified if the 
argument for animal rights is sound. One complaint might be that this approach has the weakness of 
not addressing the praxis of radical activists. However, in response I would make the point that 
asking whether, and under what circumstances, an act might be justified can be as valuable (if not 
moreso) than asking whether the justifications offered for specific acts are good ones. At the very 
least this approach creates a standard against which real-world justifications can be measured. 
Furthermore, it has the added advantage of making the defence of so-called animal rights or eco- 
terrorism free-standing from any argument for greater moral consideration for non-human animals 
or the environment.
Presumably, the case for labelling animal rights activists ‘terrorists’ hinges on the assumption that 
the targets of potential terrorism pose no threat to human beings. But why should it just be the case 
that only harms or threats to humans count for the purpose of establishing innocence? We would not 
consider a person who cruelly kicks a dog for pleasure to be innocent? Indeed, it is likely that we 
think the dog kicker to be non-innocent because the harms done to the dog are bad for the sake of 
the dog itself, and not because they illustrate poor character or make the dog-kicker more likely to 
harm humans.(For a fuller discussion on this issue see Cooke, 2011) The animal rights activist acts 
on the basis that non-human animals, like humans, have moral rights that place constraints on what 
it is permissible to do to them in the name of promoting some good. If the argument for animal 
rights is sound,[9] then those who violate their rights are not innocent and can, in some 
circumstances, be said to have forfeited their own right to immunity from attack. It is therefore open 
to activists to challenge the innocence of their targets by reference to their direct blameworthiness 
or complicity in harms done to non-human animals.[10] In the case of the dog-kicker the loss of 
immunity to attack springs from the right of a third party to intervene to protect an innocent from 
urgent and imminent threat. In other cases – where such a threat is not urgent or imminent – the apt 
response to a rights violation is likely to be quite different. In such cases the literature on just war 
theory is more relevant than that on self- or other-defence.  
The targets of animal rights activism are governments, private individuals (such as people who wear 
fur), those who cause harm directly (farmers, scientists, breeders), and those with economic 
interests in systems of animal abuse: company shareholders, suppliers, employees, directors and 
owners. In each of these cases, a causal link can be established between harms done and the targets 
of activism. Nevertheless, it is inevitable that ostensibly innocent people will have (or have had) 
their interests or property harmed by activism. The permissibility of causing harms to these people 
may be strengthened if complicity in harms to non-human animals can be shown. Comparing the 
number of people who are vegan or vegetarian (or even conscientious omnivores) to those happy to 
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consume animal products and enjoy the benefits of animal research, and inferring from the present 
state of animal protection legislation, indicates that most people approve of harmful, but legal, 
practices towards non-human animals. Furthermore, they regularly contribute money to receive 
those benefits and resist proposals for radical change. The numbers of potentially illegitimate 
victims of harms caused by activism in protest against harms to non-human animals could thus be 
fairly low, and the majority or targets can be shown to be responsible to some degree for the harms 
protested against.[11] However, in the case of environmental activism it is hard to see how those 
who cause ecological damage can be considered to be harming the environment in the morally 
relevant sense contained within definitions of terrorism. We might think of terrorist actions as 
carrying justifications couched in terms of rights violations, and whist it is possible to construct a 
case for ascribing rights to non-human animals,[12] it is hard to show that the environment or an 
ecosystem has interests or is valuable for its own sake in a way that might ground rights. 
Nevertheless, there might be cases where environmental destruction threatens humans or other 
animals in some way. Examples could include rising sea levels caused by harmful emissions, which 
threaten inhabitants of small islands, or the destruction of tribal lands in forest clearance activities. 
In such cases the environmental activist could point to the indirect threat to others caused by 
environmental damage and so cast doubt upon the innocence of their targets.
However, there may be a concern that some sensitivity to the degree of complicity held by an 
individual needs to feature strongly in any consideration in order to prevent the range of targets for 
terrorist attack from being overly expansive. One might credibly think that merely standing by in 
the face of injustice, or simply signalling assent to a wrongful act, is insufficient to constitute a 
forfeiture of rights against bodily or psychological harm. Borrowing from the literatures on just war, 
self-defence/other-defence, and punishment theory; the strong prima facie wrongness of violence 
requires that perpetrators not only establish liability, but also act in a way that is proportionate. 
Proportionality, in this case refers not only to whether the level of force is proportionate in the sense 
that it is the minimum necessary to achieve the desired outcome, but also that it is sensitive to the 
degree of harm caused, or threat posed, by the target of violence. Making use of such considerations 
would restrict the strongest forms of violence to those directly engaged in unjust acts. Thus, we 
might draw an analogy between an unjust war and the treatment of non-human animals. In an unjust  
war, targets for lethal violence are standardly[13] thought to be combatants and perhaps also those 
who directly contribute by producing munitions in support of it.(cf. Anscombe, 1961) In the animals 
case, this would make vivisectors, farmers, those who work in abattoirs, circus trainers etc. 
potentially legitimate targets, but would rule out those who merely support harms to animals by 
voting for particular political parties or enjoying the benefits resulting from those harms. In the 
environmental case, it would make those who directly pollute or destroy the environment liable to 
more significant harms than those who merely purchase products created by polluting companies. 
Additionally, we might ask if those engaged in harmful practices can offer convincing justifications 
or excuses that would render them non-culpable for their actions. If it is true that non-human 
animals should be considered rights-bearers, then justifications for rights-violations based on good 
consequences for humans will be insufficient for this.
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One worry here is that the process of establishing liability for harms requires, as in just war theory, 
that there be a legitimate authority to make judgements of liability. If animals do possess moral 
rights, then the issue hinges upon whether individual agents are morally permitted to make extra-
institutional judgements of liability to harm in cases of non-compliance with the requirements of 
morality and in the absence of a just legitimate authority. As already discussed, in cases where 
threats are urgent and immanent, we commonly think that agents are permitted to intervene to 
prevent harm, but where this is not the case the question remains open. This is a wider question on 
the limits of duties to bring about a just society and the issue of political violence than the narrow 
issue of animal rights and ecological protection and cannot be adequately addressed here.
Before concluding, it is worth re-iterating and clarifying the point that the establishment of 
responsibility for wrong-doing does not lead automatically to the forfeiture of rights against harm. 
Whether an agent is liable to violence because of wrong-doing depends very-much on features of a 
particular case. In cases where political reform is the aim the strong prima facie case against the use 
of violence requires that other avenues be exhausted first and that any force used is proportionate 
and necessary. If we examine the tactics of animal rights and environmental activists, it is clear that 
they do persistently pursue other, non-violent means of attempting political change. The success of 
these methods has been limited, and there are reasons to believe that procedural unfairness can 
make, or has made, democratic channels a dead-end for animal rights activists.(cf. Garner, 1993, p. 
230 and 237; Carter, 1998; Nestle, 2007) Furthermore, we can see that the level of force used so far 
by environmental and animal rights activists has largely been confined to property damage and 
threat of violence rather than actual violence.
The result of this analysis is not only to show that should we avoid labelling many forms of 
paradigmatic animal rights and environmental extremism as terrorism, but also to provide a partial 
justification for them. Of course, many other supporting reasons would need to be given in an all 
things considered justification. Other such factors might include: whether acts are proportionate 
responses; whether they have a chance of succeeding in their aims; whether the threat they seek to 
avert is urgent and immanent; whether non-violent methods have been exhausted; and so forth. 
Thus, whilst the strong prima facie case against violent activism or terrorism is maintained, it is not 
ruled out a priori. The importance of reassessing the moral and legal status of the more extreme 
forms of animal rights and environmental activism is high. The consequences of infelicitous use the 
terms ‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist’ can be very grave indeed. As John Hadley points out, terrorists face 
harsher penalties and longer sentences than criminals convicted of comparably violent non-political 
offences, and in addition such labelling carries de-legitimising stigma for an ideological movement 
and social censure for its advocates.(Hadley, 2009) When considering our responses to paradigmatic 
forms of animal rights and environmental extremism care must be taken in how we describe 
activists and their acts, and in how the law responds to them. To call all violent activism ‘terrorism’ 
is not only often incorrect, but can also, given the consequences of doing so, count as a wrong done 
against those who engage in radical activism.
 JTR Volume 4, Issue 2 - Autumn 2013 34
About the author: Dr Steve Cook is part of the Manchester Centre for Political Theory 
(MANCEPT) at the University of Manchester. From 2012-2013 he was the Society for Applied 
Philosophy's 30th Anniversary Research Fellow. His research examines the moral status of non-
human animals, and the ethical status of violent acts carried out in their defence by both state and 
non-state actors.
Notes
[1] Examples include the decision to classify animal rights and environmental activism as terrorism by the FBI in the USA ((“Animal 
Rights Extremism and Ecoterrorism,” n.d.)), the UK government ((Travis, 2005)), and the European law enforcement agency, 
Europol ((Europol, 2011a)).
[2] For a full discussion the problems associated with mainstream discourses surrounding animal rights activism see (Sorenson, 
2009).
[3] (Anne Schwenkenbecher, 2012; J. Angelo Corlett, 2003) Schwenkenbecher considers acts intended to change behaviour or 
carried out for purely ideological reasons as a subset of intentions to bring about political change. This is because the use of coercion 
implies that terrorists consider compliance with their demands to be morally required, and sufficient to permit the use of force to 
punish or ensure compliance. This separates terrorist claims about the status of their demands from supererogatory acts or morally 
obligatory acts that are not a matter of political morality.
[4] The act of spiking involves hammering a long nail into a tree destined to be cut down. When a logger or millworker’s chain- or 
band-saw meets the nail the saw breaks with potentially dangerous consequences for the operator.
[5] Although I have separated kinds of activity for conceptual clarity it is clear that some acts will have multiple purposes. A raid on a 
laboratory to rescue animals might be filmed for the purpose of communicating a moral message, and files might be stolen for the 
purpose of committing a terrorist act or sabotaging research. Individual cases will need to be assessed according to the different 
intentions and methods present.
[6]One reason not to separate violent communicative acts of conviction aimed at bringing about political change from non-violent 
ones is that there doesn’t seem to be any fitting term to describe the former kind of act so as to distinguish it from both non-violent 
and non-communicative acts. The term ‘direct action’ might be used to describe all types of illegal acts of conviction, but we still 
need appropriate terms to classify kinds of direct action: sabotage, rescue, civil disobedience etc.
[7]This includes acts such as chaining oneself to a tree to prevent logging, or sit-down protests to prevent road building.
[8]Whilst reports such as those referenced below often fail to distinguish between intentions behind the planting of such devices it is 
necessary to consider whether they were planted in order to cause damage, strike fear, or communicate conviction before they can be 
correctly described as terrorist.
[9] For reasons of space and scope I will not present a full defence of animal rights here; see instead: (Cochrane, 2010; DeGrazia, 
2002; Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2010; Francione, 2008; Garner, 2002; Regan, 2004; Rowlands, 2002). Whilst this paper sits within a 
rights-based moral framework, many groups involved in environmental and animal liberationist activities offer non-rights based 
justifications and ethical frameworks for their actions. See, for example, (Donovan and Adams 2007; Warren 1990; Adams 2010; 
Bat-Ami Bar On and Ferguson 1998; Callicott 1989; Sessions 1995; Foreman 1991). Many of the arguments I present should also 
hold, with perhaps minor modifications, if grounded in these alternative approaches.
[10] See, (Hadley, 2009) Consider also that non-human animals, lacking moral agency, could be considered to be a paradigm case of 
innocent victims themselves.
[11] Indeed, there may be some forms of extremism, such as the contamination of meat products that by nature requires that a target 
demonstrates their complicity in the harms activists campaign against.
[12]See the interest-bases theories of Joel Feinberg or Alasdair Cochrane for example: (Cochrane, 2010; Feinberg, 1986)
[13] Although not without contestation; see, for example: (Frowe, 2011)
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